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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
As stated by Appellant, the sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial
court committed reversible error in ruling that Appellant failed to strictly or substantially
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Appellant appeals from the trial
court's grant of a motion to dismiss and "[t]he propriety of a trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of law that [appellate courts] review for
correctness." Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issue presented in this
appeal:
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.
"Governmental entity" means the state and its political
subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
"Political subdivision" means any . . . public transit district.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) & (7).
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental
entity. . . shall file a written notice of claim with the entity
before maintaining an action. . . . The notice of claim shall be
. . . directed and delivered to the president or secretary of the
board, when the claim is against a special district.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) & (3)(b)(ii)(D).

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . [and] (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted
If, on a
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.
UtahR. Civ. P. 12(b).
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The complete text of these statutes and rules are provided in the Addendum hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of Facts
On September 21, 1998, an accident occurred while Appellant was boarding a bus

owned by UTA. (R. 2) On September 22, 1998, David C. Pitcher ("Pitcher"), a claims
adjuster employed by UTA, sent Appellant a letter informing her that, as a passenger
injured on a UTA bus, she was entitled to certain Personal Injury Protection benefits.
(R. 20-21) On October 25, 1998, Appellant's counsel at that time, Mitchell R. Jensen
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("Jensen"), sent a letter to Pitcher requesting information regarding UTA's insurance
policy. (R. 23) Over the next nine months, Jensen and Pitcher traded correspondence
regarding payments of Appellant's Personal Injury Protection benefits. (R. 79)
On August 6, 1999, Jensen sent a letter addressed solely to Pitcher and to Utah
State Attorney General Jan Graham. (R. 25-26) The letter purported to be a notice of
claim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. (Id.) The letter also referenced Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)(5) as authority. (Id.)
On September 24, 1999, Pitcher sent Jensen a letter noting that Appellant did not
comply with statutory requirement mandating that a notice of claim be served upon
UTA's president or secretary. (R. 29) Consequently, the letter noted, Appellant may not
maintain her claim against UTA.
Jensen responded by sending a letter on October 7, 1999, asserting that addressing
the notice of claim to the Attorney General is sufficient, and that Pitcher told Jensen to
provide Pitcher with a notice of claim. (R. 31) Pitcher responded on October 13, 1999,
with a letter informing Jensen that Pitcher never represented that a notice of claim
addressed to Pitcher was proper, and referring Jensen to the statute requiring delivery of
notices of claim to UTA's president or secretary. (R. 34)
B.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below
On October 26, 1999, Appellant filed her Complaint against UTA. (R. 1) UTA

responded to Appellant's Complaint with a Motion to Dismiss filed on November 22,
1999. (R. 10) In support of its Motion to Dismiss, UTA asserted that: (1) UTA is a
governmental entity within the meaning of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the
3

"Act"); (2) as a jurisdictional prerequisite to her lawsuit, the Act required Appellant to
direct and deliver a notice of claim to UTA's president or secretary; and (3) Appellant
failed to direct and deliver notice of claim in the manner required by the Act. (R. 10-11,
15-17)
In opposition to UTA's Motion to Dismiss, Appellant argued that she should not
be held to strict compliance with the Act's requirements because she had substantially
met the Act's purposes. (R. 39-41) Appellant contended that "[d]uring a telephone call
between Mr. Jensen and Mr. Pitcher, [Mr. Jensen] was directed to send all
communications including the Notice of Claims to Mr. Pitcher." (R. 36-37) Jensen
submitted an affidavit in which he recounted this telephone conversation in a single
paragraph:
Over the course of the next several months, Affiant contacted
Mr. Pitcher to discuss the submission of materials and
information necessary to evaluate and resolve the personal
injury claim. During one of these conversations, I inquired of
Mr. Pitcher to whom should I send the supporting information
and Notice of Claim. He told me to send it to him. I then
indicated the Notice would be sent prior to the supporting
materials which may not be available before the one-year
Notice period expired.
(R.52)
Pitcher also submitted a sworn affidavit providing the following account of the
telephone conversation at issue:
On or about June 23, 1999,1 telephoned Jensen to update the
status of Plaintiff s injury claim. Jensen informed me he was
preparing a settlement demand to be sent to UTA. This was
the first and only telephone conversation I had with Jensen
regarding Plaintiffs claim. During this telephone
4

conversation, Jensen stated that he needed to send a notice of
claim to UTA. I responded in the affirmative.
Jensen never inquired as to whom the notice of claim should
be sent.
Jensen never asked if I would accept delivery of Plaintiff s
notice of claim.
In no way did I ever represent to Jensen or anyone else that I
was authorized to accept delivery of Plaintiff s notice of
claim.
In no way did I ever represent to Jensen or anyone else that I
would in fact accept delivery of Plaintiff s notice of claim, or
lhat he should send the notice of claim to me.
Jensen sent no written correspondence to me confirming our
telephone conversation. Likewise, I sent no written
correspondence to Jensen confirming our telephone
conversation.

At no point was I authorized, expressly or impliedly, by
UTA's president, secretary, or any other member of UTA's
board of directors, to accept delivery of Plaintiff s notice of
claim.
(R. 79-80)
Following oral argument on January 26, 2000, the trial court denied UTA's,
Motion to Dismiss. (R. 92) However, the trial court granted UTA leave to renew its
motion after 60 days in which the parties could conduct discovery regarding factual
issues raised by UTA's motion. (R. 92-93) Accordingly, Appellant deposed both Pitcher
and UTA's general counsel. (R. 98, 100)
Upon completion of this discovery, UTA filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss on
May 8, 2000. (R. 104-05) In support of its Renewed Motion, UTA noted that, in his
5

deposition, Pitcher had confirmed the account of his telephone conversation with Jensen.
(R. 114-15) UTA argued that discovery revealed no basis for Appellant to escape the
consequences of her failure to correctly file a notice of claim. (R. 110-17)
In opposition to UTA's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Appellant again argued that
she should not be held to strict compliance with the Act. (R. 198-200) Appellant argued
that a previous case involving UTA, Serrato v. Utah Transit Authority, and Pitcher's
failure to inform Jensen that Appellant failed to comply with the Act, warranted denial of
UTA's Renewed Motion to Dismiss. (Id.) In response, UTA contended that the Serrato
case was distinguishable from this case, and that Pitcher had no duty to mind Appellant's
deadlines and prosecute her case. (R. 237-39)
Following oral argument, the trial court granted UTA's Renewed Motion to
Dismiss in a Minute Entry entered on May 23, 2000. (R. 244) On June 19, 2000, the
trial court entered an Order of Dismissal With Prejudice, in which the court ruled that
Appellant "failed to strictly or substantially comply with the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, and that [Appellant] has been represented by counsel and that [UTA] had
no legal obligation to help [Appellant] prosecute her case." (R. 246-47)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant undisputedly failed to comply with statutory requirements that Utah
courts strictly enforce. Appellant seeks refuge from her failure to strictly comply with
the Act by pointing to loosely-recognized exceptions to strict compliance, and to a
selective rendition of the underlying facts.
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Specifically, Appellant argues that estoppel and "unique facts" require reversal
based on Pitcher's failure to notify Jensen of Appellant's deficient notice of claim, and on
Jensen's telephone conversation with Pitcher. However, the facts and governing law
surrounding these claims demonstrate that the trial court correctly dismissed Appellant's
Complaint for failure to comply with the Act.
As a matter of Utah law:
Where the statutes are clear . . . as to the requirement for
serving a notice of claim on a political subdivision, we cannot
require and the statutes do not require that the state or its
subdivisions promptly notify claimants of deficiencies of the
notice of claim so as to allow them an opportunity to timely
rectify their error or deficiency.
Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1996). In other words, neither Pitcher nor
anyone else at UTA had a duty to notify Jensen that Appellant's notice of claim was
defective. Rather, the responsibility for correctly pursuing Appellant's claim fell
squarely on Jensen's shoulders.
As to Jensen's telephone conversation with Pitcher, Utah law does not permit
estoppel claims against governmental entities absent specific written representations from
authorized officials. The undisputed facts show that, assuming his account of the
telephone conversation is accurate, Jensen relied on a vague undocumented oral
representation. Jensen did not obtain or send written confirmation of this alleged
representation, nor did he confirm whether Pitcher had authority to make it. Moreover,
Appellant's notice of claim contained numerous preclusive errors for which Jensen
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cannot blame Pitcher, showing that Jensen was operating on mistaken assumptions about
the Act, not misinformation from Pitcher.
These undisputed facts, viewed through governing legal principles, add up to a
finding that Appellant may not rely on estoppel, unique facts, or any other purported
exception to what Utah courts uniformly require: strict compliance with the Act.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's order dismissing Appellant's
Complaint.
ARGUMENT
I.

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE ACT

Appellant does not dispute that she failed to comply with an express requirement
imposed by the Act. The Act mandates that "[a]ny person having a claim for injury
against a governmental entity. . . shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before
maintaining an action." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp. 2000). UTA is a public
transit district and a governmental entity for purposes of this requirement. See id. § 6330-2(3) & (7); Salt Lake On Track v. Salt Lake City, 939 P.2d 680, 681 (Utah 1997).
Notices of claim against public transit districts like UTA must be "directed and delivered
to . . . the president or secretary of the board5' of directors of the district. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(D) (Supp. 2000).
Thus, the Act mandated that Appellant file a notice of claim with UTA by
directing and delivering such a notice to the president or secretary UTA's board of
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directors. Appellant does not dispute that, rather than following this requirement, she
sent a notice of claim to UTA's claims adjuster and to Attorney General Jan Graham.
II.

UTAH LAW REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE
ACT

Appellant's claim that she substantially complied with the Act does not permit her
to escape the consequences of her failure to properly direct and deliver a notice of claim.
Although the trial court found that Appellant neither strictly nor substantially complied
with the Act, Utah appellate courts "have consistently required strict compliance with
the requirements of the Immunity Act." Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,
1203 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah
1996) (affirming dismissal for failure to serve notice of claim on proper parties);
Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (affirming dismissal for failure to
specifically articulate claims in notice of claim); Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911
P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (affirming dismissal for failure to serve notice of
claim on proper parties); Lamarr v. Department of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) (affirming dismissal for failure to serve notice of claim on proper parties).
Utah courts hold claimants to such a rigid standard under the Act that even
"[a]ctual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet these requirements." Rushton, 977
P.2d at 1203. Moreover, arguments that a claimant "effectively complied" with the Act's
delivery requirements, or that "the intent of the statute was satisfied," do not permit
claimants to sidestep the Act's service requirements. Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540-41. Utah
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law requires exacting conformity with the Act and failure to meet this standard "deprives
the court of subject matter jurisdiction." Rushton, 977 P.2d at 1203.
Accordingly, Appellant's claim that she substantially complied with the Act does
not warrant reversal because Utah law does not recognize substantial compliance with the
Act. Moreover, as demonstrated below, the facts in this case do not warrant overlooking
Appellant's failure to strictly comply with the Act.
III.

APPELLANT'S ESTOPPEL AND UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES
CLAIMS ARE BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW

In addition to claiming that she substantially complied with the Act, Appellant
claims that UTA is estopped from raising her noncompliance and that "unique facts"1
justify her failure to comply with the Act. Appellant bases these claims on Pitcher's
failure to inform Jensen that Appellant's notice of claim was incorrectly filed, and on
Jensen's telephone conversation with Pitcher. However, these arguments do not amount
to a showing of estoppel or unique facts.
A.

Pitcher's Failure To Inform Jensen Of Appellant's Defective
Notice of Claim Does Not Support A Finding Of Estoppel Or
Unique Circumstances

Appellant hinges her estoppel and unique facts arguments on the fact that Pitcher
did not notify Jensen that Appellant's notice of claim did not meet the Act's delivery
requirements. However, the Utah Supreme Court has squarely held that:
1

Appellant bases her "unique facts" claim on Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d
1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), in which the court affirmed "the long-standing rule
requiring strict compliance with all aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act," and
ruled that exceptions recognized in previous cases are "limited by their unique factual
underpinnings."
10

Where the statutes are clear . . . as to the requirement for
serving a notice of claim on a political subdivision, we cannot
require and the statutes do not require that the state or its
subdivisions promptly notify claimants of deficiencies of the
notice of claim so as to allow them an opportunity to timely
rectify their error or deficiency.
Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1996).
The Act is very clear: "[t]he notice of claim shall be . . . directed and delivered to
. . . the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against a special district,"
such as UTA. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(b)(ii)(D) (Supp. 2000). Contrary to
Appellant's claims, neither Pitcher, nor anyone else at UTA, had a duty to notify Jensen
of the mistakenly-delivered notice of claim. The Act's requirements were reasonably
within Jensen's knowledge, and Pitcher had no duty to assist Jensen in suing UTA.
Appellant disputes this conclusion, pointing to Serrato v. Utah Transit Authority,
Civil No. 980903929, another case in which Pitcher did not inform a claimant's counsel
of a mistakenly-served notice of claim.2 However, the Serrato case was fundamentally
different from this case. Serrato involved a prior version of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11.
Under the codification of § 63-30-11 at issue in Serrato, notices of claim were required to
be delivered to UTA's "governing body." See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1993). The
Serrato plaintiffs argued that delivery to Pitcher was the same as delivery to UTA's

2

Appellant also references Koch v. Utah Transit Authority, Civ. No. 97090452, in
support of her argument. The Koch case was not even mentioned in the proceedings
below and is certainly not part of the record before this Court. Accordingly, UTA hereby
moves this Court for an order striking footnote 2 of Appellant's brief. In any event, Koch
was not a case involving dismissal for failure to correctly deliver a notice of claim.
Rather, the parties settled the Koch case upon UTA's payment on the plaintiffs claim.
11

governing board. (Id.) The plaintiffs also pointed to confusion in Utah case law as to
what constitutes service on a "governing body." (Id.)
After the claim arose in Serrato, but before the claim arose in this case, the
Legislature amended § 63-30-11 to designate specific individuals to whom a notice of
claim must be delivered. See 1998 Utah Laws ch. 164, § 1. Under the codification of
§ 63-30-11 at issue in this case, notices of claim must be delivered to "the president or
secretary of the board." See id. The amended version of § 63-30-11 removes any
confusion as to whom notices of claim should be delivered, as well as any concerns about
the effect of Pitcher's failure to notify attorneys of errant notices of claim.
By amending § 63-30-11, the Legislature also removed the concerns underlying
the Utah Court of Appeals' limited holding in Bischel v. Merrit 907 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995), a case relied upon by Appellant. As in Serrato, the codification of § 63-3011 at issue in Bischel required service on the entity's "governing body," and the
confusion created by this requirement comprised the basis of the Bischel court's holding.
See id. at 278. The Legislature cleared this confusion before Appellant served her
defective notice of claim and therefore Bischel does not apply to this case.
B.

Jensen's Telephone Conversation With Pitcher Does Not
Support A Finding Of Estoppel Or Unique Circumstances

The facts surrounding the telephone conversation at issue in this case, and the
governing law applied to these facts, undermine Appellant's estoppel and unique
circumstances claims. First, "[a]s a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a
governmental entity"' and exceptions to this rule generally require "specific written
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representations by authorized government entities." Anderson v. Public Service
Common, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). Appellant claims that,
during a telephone conversation, Pitcher told Jensen to send him Appellant's notice of
claim. Appellant insists that this alleged oral statement estops UTA from asserting that
Appellant failed to correctly deliver her notice of claim.
In other words, Appellant claims UTA is estopped from asserting a jurisdictional
notice requirement—which is enforced with strict compliance—based on a telephone
conversation.- Jensen neither requested written confirmation of his telephone
conversation with Pitcher, nor did he send a confirming letter to Pitcher. Instead, Jensen
waited almost two months before sending the purported notice of claim to Pitcher and
Attorney General Jan Graham. Moreover, Jensen never verified that Pitcher had
authority to waive the notice of claim delivery requirement. Because she can point to no
specific written representations from authorized government officials, Appellant cannot
demonstrate estoppel in this case.
Second, as Appellant's attorney, Jensen had a duty to ensure that a notice of claim
was correctly filed. Pitcher had no such duty. Appellant presumably retained Jensen to
navigate the Act's complexities. In doing so, Jensen should have familiarized himself
with the Act's express delivery requirements rather than seeking legal advice from the
opposing party's claims adjuster as to how to fulfill these requirements.3 This is not a
case where an unwitting lay person sought advice while pursuing her own claim. In fact,
As a matter of law, claims adjusters like Mr. Pitcher may not provide legal advice. See
Utah State Bar v. Summerhaves & Havden. 905 P.2d 867 (Utah 1995).
13

Pitcher testified that, when he receives incorrectly-delivered notices of claim from
unrepresented parties, he notifies them of their mistake. (R. 198, 218) Under these
circumstances, Appellant should not be able to sidestep the Act's requirements by
claiming that Pitcher had a duty to educate her lawyer.
Third, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Appellant's failure to comply with the
Act resulted from Jensen's omissions, not UTA's conduct. Appellant does not allege that
Pitcher told Jensen to deliver a notice of claim to Utah Attorney General Jan Graham.
Yet, Jensen did just that. In fact, Jensen maintained that: "It is . . . our reading of the
statute that service on the Attorney General is sufficient." (R. 120) As a matter of law,
service on the Attorney General is not sufficient. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30ll(3)(b)(ii)(D).
Also, in Appellant's errant notice of claim, Jensen referenced Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(a)(5) as authority. (R. 25) However, service of a notice of claim is
governed by the Act, not the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. More specifically:
Rule 4 applies specifically to service of a summons and
complaint, not the prelitigation notice of claim required by
statute when one wishes to assert a claim against a
governmental entity. Filing a notice of claim upon the person
designated in Rule 4 does not guarantee compliance with the
Governmental Immunity A c t . . . .
Busch v. Salt Lake Int'l Airport, 921 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Moreover,
Rule 4(e)(l 1), not 4(a)(5),4 governs service of court pleadings on UTA.
4

The provision cited by Jensen for authority, Rule 4(a)(5), does not exist. Jensen was
presumably referring to Rule 4(e)(5), which governs service on corporations. However,
service of court pleadings on UTA is governed by Rule 4(e)(l 1), which mandates service
on "any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secretary."
14

These facts demonstrate that Jensen was operating under mistaken assumptions
about the Act, not misinformation from Pitcher.5 As with the other undisputed facts,
Jensen's erroneous suppositions regarding the Act undermines Appellant's estoppel and
unique circumstances claims.
Fourth, assuming it is entirely accurate, Jensen's account of the telephone
conversation at issue does not amount to a finding of estoppel or unique facts. Jensen's
account of this telephone conversation is as follows: "I inquired of Mr. Pitcher to whom
should I sendihe supporting information and Notice of Claim. He told me to send it to
him." (R. 52) This account leaves open the possibility that Pitcher told Jensen to send
the supporting information, but not the notice of claim, to Pitcher. Moreover, Jensen also
asserts that the telephone conversation concerned "the submission of materials and
information necessary to evaluate and resolve [Appellant's] personal injury claim." (Id.)
In other words, the telephone conversation did not primarily concern service of
Appellant's notice of claim.
More than what it stated, what Jensen's affidavit failed to state controverts
Appellant's estoppel and unique facts arguments. Jensen did not claim that he and
Pitcher discussed the Act's notice of claim delivery requirements. He did not claim that
The trial court recognized Jensen's shortcomings during oral argument:
THE COURT: You're talking about a personal injury mill when you
talk about Siegfried & Jensen. You're not talking . . . about
experienced counsel who is careful, thorough and does a good job.
It doesn't happen in a firm like that; all the work in those firms get
done by paralegals and public adjustors.
(Tr. 20)
15

Pitcher stated in any way that he was waiving or foregoing these requirements. He did
not claim that Pitcher stated that he had permission from UTA's President or Secretary to
accept delivery of Appellant's notice of claim. Also conspicuously absent from Jensen's
affidavit is any allegation that Pitcher ever stated that Jensen's purported notice of claim
was delivered correctly. In light of these failures, Jensen's account of the telephone
conversation does not support an estoppel or unique facts claim.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that Appellant failed to comply with the Act. As she did before
the trial court, Appellant has completely failed to present a valid reason for avoiding the
consequences of this failure. Utah law requires strict compliance with Act and the facts
and governing law simply do not permit Appellant to rely on the exceptions to strict
compliance that she asks this Court to recognize. Therefore, this Court should affirm the
trial court's order dismissing Appellant's Complaint.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of November, 2000.
SNELL&WILMER

n^Myf
Alan L. Siitttfan (J
Scott C. Sandberg
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM

1
63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages against a
governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees,
commissioners, members of a governing body, members of a board, members of a commission,
or members of an advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 67-5b-104,
student teachers holding a letter of authorization in accordance with Sections 53A-6-103 and
53A-6-104, educational aides, students engaged in providing services to members of the public
in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training
program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not
the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this
chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique
to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or
governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee,
agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other
injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a
private person or his agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, public transit
district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or taxing district, or other governmental
subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or
personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority,
commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch. 103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1; 1983,
ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338; 1991, ch. 248, § 6;
1994, ch. 192, § 1; 1994, ch. 260, § 79; 1999, ch. 108, § 32; 2000, ch. 224, § 12.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment by ch. 192, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Section
67-5b-104" for "Section 62A-4-603" in Subsection (2)(a) and made a punctuation change.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 260, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "Section 62A-4a-503" for "Section
62A-4-603" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1999 amendment, effective July 1, 1999, substituted "Section 53A-6-104" for "Section 53A-6-101"
in Subsection (2)(a).
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "holding a letter of
authorization" for "certificated" and "Sections 53A-6-103 and" for "Section."
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63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal disability [Effective until
July 1,2001].
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a
private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim
with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal
guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the boatrd, when the claim is against a
school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when the
claim is against any other public board, commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and without a
legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time
for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may extend the time for
service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the
delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in
maintaining its defense on the merits.
63-30-11, Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal disability - Appointment
of guardian ad litem [Effective July 1, 2001].
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a
private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim
with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
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(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal
guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a
school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when the
claim is against any other public board, commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and without a
legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time
for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may extend the time for
service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the
delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in
maintaining its defense on the merits.
(d) (i) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a
governmental entity is sustained by a potential claimant described in Subsection (4)(a), that
government entity may file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem
for the potential claimant.
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this Subsection (4)(d), the time for filing a claim
under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins when the order appointing the guardian is issued.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4; 1991,
ch. 76, § 6; 1998, ch. 164, § 1; 2000, ch. 157, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "the employee's" for
"his" in Subsection (2); deleted "the responsible governmental entity according to the requirements of
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13" from Subsection (3)(b)(ii); added Subsections (3)(b)(ii)(A) to (3)(b)(ii)(F);
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and made stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 2000 amendment, effective July 1, 2001, added Subsection (4)(d).
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Rule 12L Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days after the service
of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or
order of the court. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an
answer thereto within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is
ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise
directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a
different time is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be
served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if
a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or
more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after
the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense
in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such
time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of
this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in
subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party,
unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement before interposing his
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after
notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no
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responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days
after the service of the pleading upon him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it
the other motions herein provided for and then available to him. If a party makes a motion under
this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available to him which this
rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or reply,
except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears
by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of
as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of
any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff When the plaintiff in an action resides out of
this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to
furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing
and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such
costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any
officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to fie undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an
order dismissing the action.
History: Amended effective Sept. 4,1985; April 1,1990.
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.
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History: Amended effective November 1,1997.
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, in Subdivision (c), substituted the first sentence for the
former first sentence which read "The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing"; deleted the former second sentence which read "The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits"; and deleted "forthwith" following "rendered" in the present second
sentence.

© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. Allrightsreserved.

